




PORTUGUESE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY 










Inês Silva Macedo 




















PORTUGUESE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY 
















A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Law 
Supervised by Professor Sofia Oliveira Pais 
  
   
 


























To my parents. 
To my Godparents. 


























 There could be no other way to initiate the hereby presented acknowledgements 
than by addressing my deepest gratitude to my most solid foundation, my parents, for 
being the best role model I have since I can remember, and also for being my source of 
boundless love, care and inspiration.  
 Furthermore, I would also like to thank my godparents and my grandmother, 
who have always made an extraordinary effort to provide me with the best education, 
which proved to be essential to my personal and academic development. 
 Then, I would like to thank Faculdade de Direito da Universidade do Porto and 
Universidade Católica Portuguesa, for providing me with a high standard education and 
for letting me freely explore and, consequently, grow within the law intricacies.  
 I must, as well, address my acknowledgments to Vieira de Almeida e 
Associados law firm, particularly to Oporto’s team, for the time provided to elaborate 
this essay and, above all, for the incommensurable contribution given to my personal 
and professional development. 
 In addition, I must also express my deepest appreciation to Professor Sofia 
Oliveira Pais, who kindly accepted the supervision of this master’s thesis, for all the 
time expended and the wise advice given, which were absolutely crucial for the 
development of this master’s thesis. 
 I would also like to thank my friends, for their encouraging words, as well as for 
their patience and endless care and advice. I must, however, address a special 
acknowledgement to Joana Isabel, Catarina, Diana, Mónica, Joana Alexandra, Joana 
Filipa and Teresa. 
 Last, but not least, I would like to thank each and every one who expended some 
of their precious time helping me with the elaboration of the current master’s thesis, 






The awareness of the constant and impetuous development of technology and 
the internet has led the European Union’s agenda to target a considerable part of its 
efforts to strengthening the Digital Single Market. Bearing in mind that objective, on 
May 2015 the Commission launched a sector inquiry into the e-commerce of consumer 
goods and digital content as part of its Digital Single Market strategy, and has since 
been working actively towards this objective. 
Escorting closely this recent stream, the aim of this master’s thesis is to analyse 
one of the big concerns that the digital revolution has brought to European competition 
law, online sales and their regulation. Focusing particularly on the distribution 
agreements, this essay will be devoted to the study of the distribution law in an online 
context. Structurally inserted in the main area of vertical restraints, distribution 
agreements ought to be analysed under the remit of what both article 101 TFEU and 
Block Exemption Regulation dispose. Therefore, these are going to be the cornerstones 
of this study, along with the case law of European and national courts, which constitute 
a crucial tool to understand and, foremost, develop this subject, allowing for a better 
interpretation adapted to the necessities of the market. 
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Being the globalization process the one to blame on fastening the process of 
spreading information, as well as on increasing the amount of international economic 
operators and transactions, it has, therefore, contributed to shrinking the market 
barriers
1
. As a result of this phenomenon, companies felt the need to take action in order 
to control, as much as possible, the commercialization of their products and services, 
finding in distribution agreements a powerful tool to control the whole process. 
Nevertheless, this tool seems to be as powerful as it is hazardous, constituting one of the 
major concerns of the European Union’s competition policy. Thus, acknowledging that 
the internet and technology surpass national borders, originating the possibility to 
operate any kind of commercial transaction worldwide, it is extremely important to 
understand that the legal framework needs to accompany such development, keeping up 
with the needs of the digital market era
2
. Therefore, our ambition with the elaboration of 
the hereby presented master’s thesis is precisely analyse what article 101 TFEU, the 
new VBER and accompanying guidelines dispose, as well as courts and national 
authorities’ decisions – mainly targeted to the physical market scenario – and, given the 
fact that the Commission considers a ban on online sales as a hardcore restriction
3
, 
understand (if possible) in what sort of situations can it be justified and, thus, 
acceptable. 
The competition law applicable to distribution agreements has, until now, been 
subject of important reforms: the adoption of a vertical restraints block exemption 
regulation in 1999 and guidelines to help its interpretation, and, later, in 2010, a renewal 
                                                 
1
 The constant expansion of technologies and the internet has entailed the possibility of enlarging 
geographical markets, increasing the opportunities to buy and sell on a global scale, regardless of the 
physical barriers that traditionally used to hinder commercial transactions. For instance, while some years 
ago it was almost impossible for a Portuguese enterprise to sell its products in all the 27 MS of the EU, as 
it would be highly expensive to set brick and mortar stores in every single MS, nowadays, on the 
contrary, it is possible (and very common) to present the products and all their characteristics on the 
enterprise’s website, dismissing the necessity of having a physical store. 
2
 “Simplified and modern rules for online and digital cross-border purchases will encourage more 
businesses to sell online across borders and increase consumer confidence in cross border e-commerce. 
If the same rules for e-commerce were applied in all EU Member States, 57% of companies say they 
would either start or increase their online sales to other EU Member States.” – Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and 
the Committee of the Region: A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe, COM (2015) 192 final, pages 
4 and 5. 
3
 Guidelines, para. 52. 
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of that regulation with the presentation of the new VBER, as well as new guidelines. 
Notwithstanding, if the legislation seems to have been settled, the issue has since been 
marked by considerable debate among the courts all over the European Union. And this 
debate is highly intensified when the matter is analysed from an online perspective, 
precisely as we are doing today. 
We can point out as recent breakthrough decisions from the ECJ illustrating this 
latent debate the Jaguar Land Rover case
4
 and the Pierre Fabre case
5
. While in the first 
case the ECJ clearly favoured protecting competition over the competitors and 
enshrined the freedom for suppliers to determine the size and extent of their distribution 
network, in the second case we find a more formalistic approach, with the ECJ’s rule 
that a prohibition on online selling in a selective distribution agreement constituted a 
restriction by object, unless objectively justified due to the nature of the product. Along 
with those decisions we have many decisions from national courts and authorities that 
defend one position as well as the other; however, similarly to what happens in the 




Reflecting this scarcity of certainty, we find a recent request for a preliminary 
ruling addressed to the ECJ, presented by Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt am Main
78
. The 
German Court questioned whether a prohibition on the members of a selective 
distribution system to sell via online marketplaces constitutes a hardcore restriction and 
also whether the preservation of a luxury image is considered an argument compatible 
with what Article 101(1) establishes. The answer for this preliminary request will 
constitute a landmark to the online sales ruling, since the Pierre Fabre case was decided 
under the old VBER rules and within a much different context from what we face 
nowadays. Therefore, one crucial conclusion can be drawn: although this topic has been 
discussed for long, the truth is that it is still far from being clearly settled, which 
corroborates the pertinence of the analysis we hereby present.  
                                                 
4
 Case C-158/11: Auto 24 SARL v Jaguar Land Rover France SAS [2012]. 
5
Case C-439/09: Pierre Fabre Dermo-Cosmétique SAS v Président de l’Autorité de la Concurrence and 
Others [2011]. 
6
 See VOGEL, Louis, Efficiency versus Regulation: The Application of EU Competition Law to 
distribution Agreements, Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 2013, Vol. 4, No. 3, pp. 277-
284. 
7
 Provincial Court of Appeal in Frankfurt am Main, Germany. 
8
 Case C-230/16: Coty Germany GmbH v Parfümerie Akzente GmbH [2016]. 
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I. The Digital Single Market Strategy 
 
 
1. The impact of a new digital era: a renewed internal market conception 
 
“Digital technologies are going into every aspect of life. All they require is 






The internet and digital technologies are dramatically transforming our lives and 
the way we work, both as individuals and in business, as they become more integrated 
across all sectors of society and economy. Allowing the market’s expansion and the 
access to fresh income sources, this digital revolution creates unparalleled opportunities 
for innovation and growth, particularly for small and medium-sized enterprises
10
. 
Nonetheless, as beneficial as it may be, allowing to overcome the traditional physical 
barriers, it also raises challenging and intricate policy issues, mainly concerning 
competition fairness between undertakings
11
 operating, or trying to operate, in the 
market, regulation of commercial practices, the freedom of access to the market both for 
consumers and for enterprises and the protection of intellectual property rights and 
privacy
12
. It is indeed understandable why EU competition law is so deeply concerned 
with studying, developing and regulating these matters.  
Over the past few years e-commerce has seen a tremendous expansion all over 
the globe, the EU being the largest e-commerce market in the world
13
. Facing the 
                                                 
9
 JUNCKER, Jean-Claude, 2016 State of the Union address: presented before the Members of the 
European Parliament, in Strasbourg (4th September 2016). 
10
 In a survey in which more than 4800 SMEs in 12 countries took part, McKinsey&Company researchers 
concluded that SMEs using internet technologies grew more than twice as fast as the ones that had a 
minimal web presence – see MANYIKA, James & ROXBURGH, Charles, The great transformer: The 
impact of the Internet on economic growth and prosperity, McKinsey Global Institute, October 2011, a 
survey retrieved from the website http://www.mckinsey.com. 
11
 The concept of “undertaking” was established in the Hofner & Elser case as “every entity engaged in 
an economic activity, regardless of the legal status of the entity and the way in which it is financed and, 
secondly, that employment procurement is an economic activity.” – Case C-41/90: Höfner & Elser v 
Macroton GmbH [1991], para 21. 
12
 See CIAN, Marco, Competition and Access to the Market A Need for a Special Regulation in Online 
Service Supplying?, EuCML: Journal of European Consumer and Market Law, Issue 1-2/2015, page 47. 
13
 See European Commission, Preliminary Report on the E-commerce Sector Inquiry, SWD (2016) 312 
final, page 8. 
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inevitable reality of its constant growth, achieving a single market fully adapted to the 
new digital era will give Europe the possibility of maintaining its position as the world 
leader in the digital economy, allowing its companies to grow on a global scale.  
In the wake of these concerns, Europe has given the kick-off and launched the 
tactics to embrace the new digital reality. Starting with the Lisbon Strategy, that aimed 
to make the EU one of the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economies, 
it introduced the Digital Agenda for Europe, which proposed to explore the potential of 
the internet and technologies as a way of to fostering innovation, economic growth and 
progress 
1415
. Yet, it was not until 2015 that the Commission decided to implement a 
strategy aimed at developing a Digital Single Market
16
. With it, the Commission 
ambitions to create a single market where everyone “can access and exercise online 
activities under conditions of fair competition, and a high level of consumer and 
personal data protection, irrespective of their nationality or place of residence”
17
 thus, 
creating better access for consumers and businesses to online goods and services across 
Europe, creating the right conditions for digital networks and services to flourish and 
maximising the potential growth of a European digital economy, the primary goals 
towards the construction of this ambitioned Digital Single Market
18
. 
                                                 
14
 Presented by the Commission, the Digital Agenda is one of the seven pillars of the Europe 2020 
Strategy, which sets goals for the growth prospecting the year 2020. 
15
As we can testify with the Europe 2020 strategies’ goals and the measures taken afterwards, although 
this concern about adapting to the new digital era reality gained strength recently, the EU had not until 
then been unaware of the necessity. In fact, in May 2010 the Commission published a report entitled “A 
new strategy for the single market at the service of Europe’s economy and society”, assigned to create a 
consistent strategy to develop the European single market. Also, in 2011, digital content products were 
subject of provisions in the Directive on consumer rights – Directive 2011/83/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 25th October 2011 on consumer rights, amending Council Directive 
93/13/ECC and Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing 
Council Directive 85/577/ECC and Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
[2011] L 304/64 – and in the Proposal for a Common European Sales Law – Proposal for a Regulation of 
the European Parliament and of the Council on a Common European Sales Law, COM/2011/0635 final – 
2011/0284 (COD).  
16
 More recently the EU has presented two new proposals: Online Sales Directive - Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on certain aspects concerning contracts for the online and other 
distance sales of goods, COM (2015) 635 final -, and Directive on the Supply of Digital Content – 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on certain aspects concerning contracts for the 
supply of digital content, COM (2015) 634 final. 
17
 Communication from the Commission: A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe, op. cit, page 3.  
18




Being the cornerstone of the EU’s integration and sustainable growth, the 
internal market
19
 can be defined as an area without internal frontiers in which the free 
movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance with the EU 
legislative provisions. Facing the reality stated above about the integration of the 
internet and technologies across all sectors of society and the economy, affecting both 
people’s private lives and their business relations, the Digital Single Market can be 
perceived as a natural extension of this fundamental principle, constituting a necessary 
step to bring the EU into the digital age
20
.  However, we must be aware of the 
difficulties that will come along with this attempt at implementing a Digital Single 
Market, as Mario Monti
21
 has pertinently warned us back in 2010. Triggered by the 
crisis scenario it is going through, the EU struggles to deal with the imminent threat of 
insuring the cohesion of the single market, as Member States disbelieve the strength and 
efficiency of the EU policies and choose to pursuit protection under economic 
nationalism.  
 
2. The need for a legal framework adaptation 
 
Bearing in mind all that was stated above, we can now undoubtedly conclude that 
the EU is facing the need to adapt the legal framework that supports its competition 
policy to the new digital reality so that it does not become obsolete
22
. If the legislative 
scarcity proceeds the repercussions will be drastic as it originates entrance barriers, 
suppresses competition and diminishes the future investment throughout Europe
23
.  
Furthermore, more than the need for adaptation, there is a real need to create new 
solutions
24
 as online markets are becoming so peculiar from the point of view of the 
                                                 
19
 The internal market concept is enshrined in article 3 (c) TEU and in article 26 TFEU. 
20
 TOBIAS, James, What you need to know about the digital single market, Managing Intellectual 
Property, December 2015/ January 2016, retrieved from the website www.managingip.com. 
21
 MONTI, Mario, A new strategy for the single market at the service of Europe’s economy and society – 
Report to the President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso, 2010, page 6. 
22
 The Commission had already come to this conclusion – see Communication from the Commission: A 
Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe, op. cit, page 4. 
23
 See FRANCESCHI, Alberto De, The EU Digital Single Market Strategy in Light of the Consumer 
Rights Directive: The ‘Button Solution’ for Internet Cost Traps and the Need for a More Systematic 
Approach, EuCML: Journal of European Consumer and Market Law, 2015, Issue 4/2015, page 144. 
24
 We must however point out that there are some authors who disagree with this suggestion, defending 
that there is no need to create new rules – see BUCCIROSSI, Paolo, OECD Policy Roundtables – Vertical 
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access to them and of the pathways by which information spreads, that rules and the 
principles of law conceived for traditional markets are not always adequate tools for 
ensuring competition and business freedom
25
.  
As a matter of fact, if we must applaud the recent efforts from the Commission
26
, it 
is unfortunately not possible to do so when we talk about vertical restrains, especially 
when we dwell on distribution agreements. Stating that “every distributor must be 
allowed to use the internet to sell products”, the Vertical Guidelines, and the VBER 




By affecting the way goods circulate from manufacturers to consumers, the internet 
has brought the possibility to arrange new distribution methods. Speeding up the whole 
process, the internet allows retailers to transfer the orders to wholesalers, who are now 
able to deliver the goods directly to the consumer, circumventing the necessity of 
having a retailer to physically handle the goods
28
. Notwithstanding, this possibility may 
lead to a latent conflict between manufacturers and distributors, as the former might 
diminish distribution opportunities on the internet by affixing reservation clauses in 
their contracts
29
, such as exclusive distribution clauses or selective distribution clauses. 
Why would this type of clauses be affixed? Either to take control over distribution with 
the ambition to control price and quality of distribution, to alleviate free-riding, to 
restore the incentives of retailers to increase sales effort or even to build a reputation for 
high quality and convey a desired brand image, there are plenty of reasons that can lay 
                                                                                                                                               
Restraints for On-line sales: Background Note, 2013, DAF/COMP(2013)13, retrieved from 
http://www.oecd.org. 
25
 CIAN, Marco, op. cit, page 49. 
26
 As good examples, we must mention the agreement reached in February 2017 establishing new rules 
allowing Europeans to travel and enjoy online content services across borders, as well as the decision to 
put an end to roaming charges in the EU in 2017, discussed and agreed by the Commission back in 
September 2016 and the draft rules that followed this decision. 
27
 Even with the publication of the new VBER the uncertainty remained. Some authors ascribe this lack 
of regulation and certainty due to the extensive lobbying in relation to the treatment of internet sales. – 
see HALL, Mathew & RAKISON, Robert, New EU Rules for Distribution and Supply Agreements, 
EuroWatch, 2010, May 15th, pages 10 and 11; and also NEILL, Simon, Vertical Restraints Block 
Exemption: Implications for online retailers, Osborne Clarke, publication number 9340319, retrieved 
from http://www.osborneclarke.com.  
28
 see LIEBER, Ethan & SYVERSON, Chad, Online v. Offline Competition, The Oxford Handbook of the 
Digital Economy, Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 189-223. 
29
 See KIRSCH, Andreas & WEESNER, William, Can Antitrust Law Control E-Commerce? A 
Comparative Analysis in Light of U.S. and E.U. Antitrust Law, University of California Davis Journal of 
International Law and Policy, 2006, Volume 12:297, page 300. 
16 
 
beyond the existence of this type of restriction clauses
30
. The question that remains 
unanswered is whether these restriction clauses are in accordance with what the 
European competition law conceives, and our duty is to find the right response 
throughout the elaboration of this master’s thesis.  
                                                 
30
 Commission Staff Working Document: Preliminary Report on the E-commerce Sector Inquiry, SWD 
(2016) 312 final. 
17 
 




Prior to any development, we shall clarify a very important distinction between 
horizontal and vertical agreements. Whereas horizontal agreements are celebrated 
between parties operating at the same level of the economy, therefore competing, or 
aiming to compete, directly with each other, vertical agreements are the ones celebrated 
between parties operating at different levels, producing complementary products or 
services, thus providing the connection in the distribution chain until the product or 
service reaches the final consumer
31
. These two different ways of contracting diverge in 
their potential anticompetitive effect
32




During the commercialization process, a manufacturer is not merely concerned with 
producing the product he aims to sell, but he also has to plan how the distribution will 
be done. Either he has enough resources to do it by himself or he considers it preferable 
to leave distribution to independent entities that are experienced in retailing – what 
usually happens considering that the “resources required to organise a network of retail 
outlets may be large and the time taken to penetrate a market too long when a firm first 
has a product to bring to the market”
35
. Being the most commonly used distribution 
method, the use of a third party is also the one that originates more problems from the 
                                                 
31
 JONES, Alison & SUFRIN, Brenda, EU Competition Law: Text, Cases, and Materials, Fifth Edition, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, page 768. 
32
 “Whereas the latter [horizontal agreements] may eliminate competition between competing 
undertakings, the former [vertical agreements] concerns the relationship between upstream operator and 
downstream distributor or retailer. As a result, vertical agreements often generate positive effects and 
would raise concerns predominantly when there is some degree of market power at the upstream and/or 
downstream levels.” – See EZRACHI, A., EU Competition Law: An Analytical Guide to the Leading 
Cases,London: Hart Publishing, 2016, page 149.  
33
 Case 32/65: Government of the Italian Republic v Commission of the European Economic Community 
[1966], page 407.  
34
 It was not always consensual that article 101 should also be applicable to vertical agreements, however, 
since the Costen and Grundig Case, it became fully accepted that vertical agreements are also able to 
contain restrictions of competition which must be target of close scrutiny under European competition 
rules, namely article 101 - see Joined Cases 56 and 58/64: Etablissements Costen SARL and Grundig-
Verkaufs GmbH v Commission of the European Economic Community [1966], page 339. 
35
 KORAH, V. & O’SULLIVAN, D., Distribution Agreements Under the EC Competition Rules, Oxford: 
Hart Publishing, 2002, page 9.  
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point of view of the EU competition law
3637
. As this type of agreements can lead to a 
partition of national markets, it constitutes a major danger for the disaggregation of the 
single market, justifying the European competition law’s concerns on investigating this 
type of agreements in order to protect the single market integration
38
. 
Through the analysis of the literature dwelling on these matters, we understood that 
different authors have different ways of organizing the distribution methods and types 
of distribution agreements. As we find it the most logical way of doing it, we will, 




2. Distribution methods 
 
Aiming to lessen the costs, a manufacturer has the option to distribute its goods 
himself, developing an internal network throughout vertical integration. There are 
plenty of reasons why he may choose this way of distributing, the most common of 
which being the aim to achieve a high degree of efficiency and coordination, since the 
product in question is not handed from one undertaking to another, or to be exempted 
from the application of competition rules, as the internal matters of the economic 
organization do not fall under the scope of article 101(1)
40
. 
He can also opt for celebrating an agency agreement, delegating the distribution 
to an agent who will be “vested with the power to negotiate and/or conclude contracts 
on behalf of another person (the principal)”
41
. This agent will have the duty of 
negotiating sales or purchasing agreements and celebrating contracts on the producer’s 
behalf, running no risk himself since the property does not pass on to him, regardless of 
                                                 
36
 JONES, Alison & SUFRIN, Brenda, op. cit, page 773. 
37
 If the manufacturer decides to do the distribution by himself it is likely that the Commission does not 
investigate, unless it constitutes an abuse of a dominant position. - see WISH, Richard, Competition Law, 
Third Edition, London: Butterworth & Co, 1993, pp. 537. 
38
 See Joined Cases C-403/08 and C-429/08: Football Association Premier League Ltd v QC Leisure 
[2011], paras 115 and 139; and also, Joined Cases C-468/06 to C-478/06: Sot. Lélos kai Sia and Others 
[2008], paras. 65 and 66. 
39
 WISH, Richard, Competition Law, op. cit, pp. 536-602. To know more about other different 
organization methods, see KORAH, V. & O’SULLIVAN, D., op. cit,, and, also, VOGEL, L. & VOGEL, 
J., European Distribution Law, Paris: LawLex/Bruylant, 2015. 
40
 WISH, Richard, Competition Law, op.cit, page 538. 
41
 Vertical Guidelines para. 12. 
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the fact that he is the one celebrating the contract
42
. As the agent just negotiates on 
behalf of the principal, the Commission has stated that in specific cases
43
 he should be 
treated as part of the principal’s organisation, so the agreements celebrated become an 
internal matter of that organisation rather than an agreement between undertakings, 
therefore falling outside the scope of article 101(1)
4445
. 
When a producer does not distribute the goods or services himself or through an 
agent, he has to leave it to a third party who will do the resell on its own behalf, the 
independent distributors. There is therefore the need to celebrate a distribution contract, 
and it is precisely here where EU concerns begin, since a manufacturer can negotiate 
them by plenty of different manners. He can impose on the distributor to sell 
exclusively within a certain territory or even restrict the distribution to a certain number 
of distributors per area. There is also the possibility of establishing that only the retailers 
that can provide certain services are able to sell his products, as well as many other 
options. The problem is, as it was already stated above, to find out whether those 
restriction clauses are legal from the scope of the EU competition rules. 
 
3. Types of distribution 
 
Franchising Agreements: The ECJ has defined the distribution franchise agreement in 
Pronuptia Case as an agreement by “which the franchisee simply sells certain products 
in a shop which bears the franchisor’s business name or symbol”
46
. The core of a 
franchisor activity is the development of a common business format, paying a fee for 
the right to do that and accepting the responsibility to preserve the character of the 
franchise
47
. Targeting to guarantee uniformity of all the outlets and, consequently, the 
maintenance of reputation, from a strictly commercial point of view, this type of 
                                                 
42
 See WISH, Richard & BAILEY, David, Competition Law, Seventh Edition, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012, page 621. 
43
 Vertical Guidelines, paras. 12-20. 
44
 See JONES, Alison & SUFRIN, Brenda, op. cit, page 770; WISH, Richard & BAILEY, David,,op. cit, 
page 539; and also KORAH, V. & O’SULLIVAN, D., op. cit, page 5. 
45
 Notwithstanding, we must be aware that in some cases an agent can be considered as an independent 
undertaking, so there is always the need to analyse each concrete situation in order to understand whether 
it benefits from the exemption – see Case C-180/98: P. Pavlov and Another v. Stichting Pensionsfond 
Medische Specialisten [2001], paras. 70 and 71. 
46
 Case 161/84: Pronuptia [1986], para. 13. 
47
 WISH, Richard, Competition Law op. cit, page 544. 
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agreement may constitute an advantageous way of cooperation by working through the 
establishment of a hierarchy and also by giving the possibility to work with independent 




Exclusive Purchasing Agreements: The Commission has described them as 
“agreements under which the purchaser accepts an obligation to purchase particular 
goods from a single supplier only, over a relatively long period”
49
. Exclusive purchase 
agreements may prove to be beneficial at the level of efficiency, since the producer will 
have a guaranteed outlet for its products, which allows him to rationalize the 
production. This type of agreements may also be appealing for maintaining the demand, 
given the fact that a distributor who can purchase from only one producer will have an 
incentive to promote and increase sales of that specific product. From the purchaser’s 
point of view the agreement can also prove to be beneficial since the producer will be 





Exclusive Distribution Agreements: An exclusive distribution contract occurs when a 
manufacturer agrees with a distributor that he is only allowed to sell that manufacturer’s 
products within a certain territory, ensuring the distributor that he will be the only one 
in that specific territory
51
. By establishing a monopoly, this type of agreements can 
force a market foreclosure by diminishing the intra-brand competition and portioning 
the market, thus, increasing the possibilities of distorting competition within the internal 
market. However, while reducing intra-brand competition they can also originate an 
increase on inter-brand competition, leading to an ambivalent effect. Consequently, it 
has been demonstrated to be vital to embrace an economic analysis as the negative 
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Selective Distribution Agreements: We have a selective distribution agreement 
whenever a supplier not only selects its retailers, but also only allows them to sell to 
final buyers or selected dealers. This type of agreements is often used for technically 
sophisticated and for luxury goods to maintain the brand image of the products
54
. 
By applying selection criteria concerning the nature of the product, this type of 
agreements will limit the number of undertakings able to resell the products. When it 
comes to the selection criteria applied, we must establish the distinction between 
qualitative and quantitative criteria. Qualitative criteria consist of only accepting 
distributors based on objective criteria essential to the concrete distribution process - 
such as training of sales staff, the services provided at the point of sale or the assortment 
of products sold. On the other hand, quantitative criteria consist of limiting the number 




4. Treatment under the European Union competition rules 
 
  4.1. Article 101 TFEU 
  
The necessity of ruling specifically vertical agreements under article 101 may be 
easily explained by the double goal of European competition policy. On the one hand, 
agreements between producers and distributors can have a pro-competitive slant as they 
can help promote market integration and efficient distribution. On the other hand, an 
anti-competitive slant can also be found, since this kind of agreements can be used to 
partition market and to exclude the possibility of new entrants. Therefore, it is 
immediately detectable that the EU competition policy needs to regulate this matter. In 
fact, being aware of the economic context proves to be crucial for understanding the 
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The analysis of whether an agreement should be excluded
57
 for infringing article 
101 takes place in two major steps. Firstly, the agreement shall fall under the scope of 
what number 1 precludes. Then, it is necessary to ensure that it is not exempted under 
what number 3 sets out. But before entering any considerations, it is extremely 
important that we bear in mind that nowadays understanding how markets operate is an 
essential prerequisite for any analysis. Therefore, the examination of any agreement 
under the scope of article 101 demands rigorous attention to the market structure, both 
the geographic extent and the relevant products or services should be defined with 
precision.  
Addressing particularly its number 1, it is established that certain restrictive 
agreements celebrated between independent undertakings, whether they are horizontal 
agreements or vertical agreements, shall be prohibited for their incompatibility with the 
rules of the common market. As a matter of fact, when undertakings are actual or 
potential competitors, what they may decide together can affect the market structure, 
therefore it may be of interest to the competition authorities to analyse this type of 
practices.  
In order to apply this prohibition there are three bullet-points that must be 
completed: first of all, we must be facing a collusion or joint conduct - as the article 
itself explains, there should be an agreement or concerted practice between two or more 
undertakings or a decision by an association of undertakings; secondly, we must 
conclude that the collusion appreciably restricts competition- meaning that it has as its 
object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition, either from an 
individual point of view or from an extended perspective, referring to the competition as 
such
58
; lastly, it must have an appreciable effect on trade between Member States
59
. 
When the first step is fully completed, it is time to proceed and see whether the 
agreement is eligible for what number 3 determines. It provides an exception from the 
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general prohibition, conceiving an individual exemption to the agreements that can 
prove to have a beneficial effect on general welfare. As the ECJ has held, an agreement 
shall be exempted whenever “the advantages of the system for the competition outweigh 
the disadvantages”
60
. That being said, it is possible to conclude that parties should be 
extremely careful with every step they take, as the same behaviour, depending on the 
effects it can create, may either be or not be legal
61
. Since it is an exception, it must be 
applied as strictly as possible, thus only indispensable restrictions may be exempted and 
only for the minimum period necessary to enable the parties to achieve the benefits 
justifying the exemption.  
 
  4.2. Block Exemption Regulation 
 
Notwithstanding its tremendous value, article 101 has, since the beginning, 
raised questions about its own interpretation. Aiming to clarify those questions, the 
Commission has adopted some formal decisions under Regulation 1/2003
62
 and has 
introduced some “comfort letters”. However, facing a shrieking backlog, the 
Commission felt the need to adopt an approach to block exemptions. Therefore, under 
Council Regulation 19/65
63
, the Commission has been able to adopt block exemption 
regulations defining certain categories of agreements which can be protected under the 
scope of article 101(3). This regulation was a huge improvement, helping to reduce the 
mentioned backlog, nevertheless, it was heavily criticised for its formalism. Embracing 
that criticism, the Commission has since been putting an effort on implementing a more 
economic-based approach, focusing on the market power and market outcomes rather 
than exclusively on the type of agreement
64
. Following this vein, in 1999, the 
Commission came up with a Vertical Block Exemption Regulation
65
 which ought to be 
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applied to vertical agreements, along with some guidelines
66
 meant to clarify its 
interpretation and hence its application. This regulation has, however, expired on May 
2010, and, given its “overall positive experience with the application of that Regulation 
(…) and taking into account further experience acquired since its adoption”, the 
Commission decided to adopt a new VBER: Regulation 330/2010
67
. 
Along with article 101, VBER constitutes a fundamental cornerstone of the 
study of vertical agreements, establishing that the agreements falling under its scope 
should be exempted from the prohibition preconized by article 101(1), as long as they 
do not contain any hardcore restriction
68
. Providing a “safe harbour”
69
, only the 
agreements celebrated between parties who hold a market share between 15% and 
30%
70
 which do not contain any of the restrictions listed in article 4 will benefit from 
this exemption. Any agreement containing such a hardcore restriction is presumed to 
fall within article 101(1), being presumable
71
 as well that the agreement is unlikely to 
fulfil the exemption provided by article 101(3). What we end up finding here is a double 
presumption
72
: it is presumed that they are likely to have negative effects on 
competition, as well as that they do not have any positive effects that could exempt 
them from the application of what article 101(1) precludes. 
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It was not until the new VBER came out that the EU managed to introduce 
regulation regarding online sales in its vertical restraints framework. Prompting intense 
debate hitherto, the Commission soon understood that some action was needed. 
Therefore, to ensure that a suitable solution would be found, it decided to consult
73
 the 
stakeholders before publishing the new VBER, collecting many constructive opinions. 
Among all of them, we were, undoubtedly, able to perceive two different parties. On 
one side, we had pure internet players, arguing that any restriction to online sales should 
be prohibited since they may distort the competition. On the other side, we had the 
suppliers of branded products who strongly contended that imposing restrictions to 
online sales was essential in order to maintain a standard quality of their products and, 
thus, the brand’s reputation, constituting the pre- and post-sales services at the point of 
sale almost a conditio sine qua non to achieve it 
74
. 
Notwithstanding the mighty ambitions, what the new VBER and the accompanying 
Guidelines established was rather disappointing when it comes to online sales, as it only 
follows the Commission’s traditional approach with a few alterations
75
. Actually, it does 
not particularly address any new rule concerning online sales, opting to simply 
introduce more specific hardcore restrictions regarding selective distribution, leaving to 
the Guidelines the burden of developing the online sales topic. This decision can be 
highly criticised since the Guidelines are not a binding, as VBER is, limiting the 
practical effectiveness of what is established there
76
. However, some voices among the 
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literature defend that this decision appears to be wise, as at that time there was no legal 




2. Passive and active sales 
 
The Guidelines, in their paragraph 51, provide us with the distinction between 
passive and active sales, which is a traditional distinction adopted by the Commission 
that is crucial to the appreciation of the lawfulness of any agreement
78
. While active 
sales are so qualified when there is any approach -  advertisement or promotion - 
specifically targeted at a territory or customer group exclusively reserved to another 
supplier, passive sales are the simple response to unsolicited requests from individual 
customers, including the delivery of goods or services to such consumers. Thus, we 
could be misled into thinking that selling through a website constitutes an active sale 
however that is far from the truth, as the Guidelines clearly state in their paragraph 52. 
The disentanglement between general and targeted advertising or promotion may be 
very difficult to do though
79
. Notwithstanding, given the fact that internet sales are 
considered passive sales, any sale made through the internet to another territory or 
customer base cannot be restricted, since “In principle, every distributor must be 
allowed to use the internet to sell products”
80
, which is possible to do when we are 
talking about physical (or brick and mortar shop) sales. In this context, a question 
emerges: is that difference of treatment justified? Shouldn’t it be expected of EU 
competition law not to promote one form of distribution over another? 
In our opinion, even though it is understandable that the ambition behind this 
decision was to promote an unrestrained online distribution, the Commission has failed 
in analysing this issue from a practical perspective, as it is not possible to draw a clear 
distinction between passive and active sales. In fact, some online retailers own such a 
powerful brand awareness and strength that they don’t need to promote themselves 
actively to attract sales. And we cannot ignore the existence of indirect targeting that 
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endangers the presumption that online sales constitute passive sales. A good example is 
the language options used on the website or in the communication play. Despite the fact 
that the Guidelines in their paragraph 52 state that normally that does not interfere in the 
qualification, the truth is that no business will voluntarily invest in a foreign language 
website unless it believes some return from it.  What happens is that the “Commission 
proceeds with not considering online space as parallel to the physical, but more as a 
complementary”
81
, and there lays the answer to the current distinctive treatment, which 
we firmly condemn. 
 
3. Restrictions that may remove the benefit of block exemption 
 
 
3.1. Restriction by object 
 
Through the history of EU competition law, vertical restraints have always been 
treated very strictly due to the hostility towards any menace to the trade between 
Member States
82
. In fact, conscious that it could spawn net efficiencies, a more efficient 
redistribution of wealth, as well as a decrease on the possibility of originating a 
monopoly, the ambition of constructing a solid and cohesive single market - where there 
is freedom of movement of goods, people, services and capital over border-  has always 
been a primordial objective of the EU
83
. 
In order to comply with this ambitious goal, the Commission defined for the first 
time the concept, already adopted by the EU Courts, of “restriction by object” in its 
guidelines on the application of article 101(3). With this concept, the Commission 
aimed to identify those restrictions which by their nature have the object or effect of 
noticeably restrict competition, thereof, being capable of affecting trade between MS
84
, 
being the mere potentiality of competitive harm of restricting competition sufficient to 
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. Whereas an agreement has been found to restrict competition by object, 
it becomes unnecessary to operate a separate appreciability test
86
. As the author Vogel 
says, “The innovation of the restriction of competition by object by the European 
legislator and judges is thus part of general trend to improve the detection and 
repression of anticompetitive behavior" 
87
. Notwithstanding, as it was noted by the 
Advocate General in the Cartes Bancaires case
88
, the advantages of its use can only 




3.2. Hardcore restrictions 
 
Similarly to the old VBER, in the new one we find a black-clause defining the 
restrictions that prevent the application of the block exemption, which could otherwise 
be applicable where all the exemption criteria are fulfilled. Therefore, it allows 
companies that do not exceed a certain market threshold to have more flexibility in the 
negotiation of vertical agreements, which, as the authors Subiotoo and Dautricourt
90
 
enhance, is a decision that must be applauded. 
Focusing particularly in the online context, we face a slightly different scenario. 
Introducing more strictness, the Guidelines clearly state in their paragraph 52 that every 
distributor must be allowed to use the internet to sell products. Thus, any restriction that 
prevents distributors from selling their products online can constitute an outright ban, 
being eligible as a hardcore restriction. In the same paragraph, the Guidelines provide us 
with a non-exhaustive list of examples of clauses which restrict passive sales in the 
internet context, identifying some of the hardcore restrictions that shall be censured, 
such as website re-routing (a); termination of the transaction once it is detected that the 
credit card data address is not within the distributor’s territory (b); limiting the 
proportion of online sales (c); and setting a higher price for products to be sold online 
than products to be sold offline (d). 
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3.3. Acceptable restrictions 
 
These forbidden restrictions may, however, be objectively necessary under 
exceptional circumstances and, therefore, acceptable. That being said, we must be aware 
of the existence of some individual cases of hardcore restrictions that may either fall 
outside the scope of article 101(1) or fulfil the conditions precluded by article 101(3)
91
.  
The Guidelines, again, provide us with a non-exhaustive list of examples, we 
hereby leave some of them. By reading paragraph 53, we find as an acceptable 
restriction the possibility of a supplier require quality standards for the use of the 
internet site to resell goods, conceiving, thereof, the possibility to restrict the means of 
an active sale. Moving on to paragraph 54, we find out that it is also acceptable for 
suppliers to regulate online sales by subjecting them to certain proportionate quality 
standards and other lawful requirements
92
. They must nevertheless be cautious since 
these standards and requirements cannot lead to the dissuasion of appointed distributors 
of having access to the internet to reach a greater number and variety of customers. To 
conclude this set of examples, reading paragraph 56 we find that the Guidelines allow 
the suppliers to require that a distributor have at least one brick and mortar shop. We 
must, however, note that such requirements will only be lawful when the product in 
question is of such nature that it justifies the requirement of a physical outlet
93
. Along 
with these situations the Guidelines allow, in their paragraph 60, the introduction of an 
objective justification in order to exempt a hardcore restriction. Once again, a list of 
non-exhausting examples is set, such as the possibility of a distributor first selling a new 
brand to impose some restrictions to recoup the investment made and the possibility to 
restrict the active sales while testing or introducing a new product
94
. 
From the examples above we may conclude that the Commission has really put a 
notable effort on adapting to the new digital reality and achieving a more economic-
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based approach. Notwithstanding, by setting just a short list of acceptable restrictions 
combined with a clause that allows the use of objective justifications, it outbursts in a 
rather generalist solution, leaving space for numerous interpretations, thereof, claiming 




IV. Prohibition of internet sales 
 
1. Introduction: the origin of the debate95 
 
Following what was stated above, it is fair to conclude that the evolution of the 
internet as a new distribution channel, aligned with the absence of clear and unequivocal 
regulation and guidance, has been the source of a quite reluctant behaviour endorsed by 
the undertakings operating in the market. Anchored to this uncertainty, suppliers 
continuously opt to include in their distribution networks bans on the use of internet 
sales, offering a wide range of justifications concerning the nature of the products at 
issue, such as the aim to protect the prestigious image of their brand or even consumer 
health concerns
96
. Also reflecting this uncertainty scenario, we are presented with a 
variety of national case law attempting to balance competition concerns against 
distributors’ efforts to control their distribution networks
97
.  
Both the Commission and the European and national courts tend to defend that a 
restriction on the use of the internet by dealers who have been authorised to enter the 
network distribution is not allowed under what article of 4(c) VBER states. Drawing 
inspiration from the solutions promoted by the French and German courts and 
authorities, we must say however that even though the Commission considers the ban 
on online sales as a hardcore restriction, the truth is that the Guidelines provide 
suppliers with some degree of control over internet sales
98
. This breach to a less severe 
point of view, aligned with the fact that the undertakings’ worries should not be 
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completely forgotten and undervalued, raises the need to establish a compromise 
“between the finding that the restriction is black listed and the wishes of the firms using 
selective distribution to limit internet sales”
99
, and it is precisely here lays that the 
origin of the debate lies: being aware of the fact that limiting online sales constitutes a 
hardcore restriction, to what extent should we accept the objective justifications in order 
to exempt this restriction? That is the question we intend to answer. 
 
 
2. Objective justifications 
 
Along with the situations mentioned in the previous chapter
100
, the Guidelines also 
foresee the possibility presenting an objective justification in order to exempt an 
otherwise considered hardcore restriction, as we can attest by reading their paragraph 
60. Hence, many undertakings have come up with many justifications that have been 
under close scrutiny from both literature and jurisprudence in order to either corroborate 
or exclude its general application. Aware that they do not close the set, we hereby 
explore the two main arguments presented, since they are the ones with which we 
constantly deal with when reading the majority of decisions from European and national 
courts and authorities. 
 
 2.1. Preventing free-riding and opportunism 
 
We are facing a free riding situation whenever the investments inherent to the 
selling process, such as the pre- and post-sales provided to the customers, the retail 
showrooms to display products, or even the advertising of the product, cannot be 
detached from the physical product
101
. And if normally the possibility of this occurring 
was high, the panorama suffered a drastic change with the digital revolution. In fact, the 
internet, as a retailing technology, has bestowed us with the possibility of allowing a 
basic transaction actively taking place at a relatively low cost, as it is possible for any 
supplier to engage in the activity necessary to sell the product, but for a different lower-
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priced store to make the final sale
102
. When there is a risk of this type of situations 
occurring, it can constitute a huge discouragement for physical retailers to invest in that 
kind of services. As the author Margaret Slade states, “if an upstream firm invests in 
improving the quality of retail facilities, it benefits not only her own brands but also the 
brands of rivals if they are sold in the same facilities. Absent restraints, the desirability 
of the investment is lessened”
103
. 
In theory, the problem could be solved if dealers charged for pre-sale services 
separately, allowing a proper refund to the retailer or manufacturer who made the initial 
investment
104
. However, the practical application of such scheme is condemned from 
the beginning because customers are perfectly aware of the lower costs and are not 
willing to spend the same amount of money for a product sold via an internet platform. 
 
 2.2. Preservation of the brand image 
  
As it is commonly known, the internet methods of retailing, known as low-cost 
retailing methods, do not have a favourable reputation from the customers’ point of 
view. In the origin of this low reputation we find the many risks associated with the 
online selling such as counterfeiting
105
, misleading or incomplete information and an 
overall poor service during the purchasing process
106
. The consequences of these risks 
can actually be absolutely calamitous, as they may concern the health and safety of 
consumers. As an example, we can imagine the following situation: an eatable product 
that does not contain all the information about its ingredients and which is bought by a 
person who has an allergy to an ingredient that is not in the description. By eating that 
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product the person is immediately exposed to serious health issues. Also, as far as 
services concerned, we may say that if consumers have a poor experience while 
purchasing a product online, the supplier will be the one suffering the consequences by 
seeing his products criticised, badly rated and, consequently, its sell rates lowered or 
even face the need to support a monetary cost due to some kind of compensation owed 
to a customer. 
Due to those facts mentioned above, suppliers of branded and prestigious 
products, aspiring to guarantee an appropriate ambience as well as the providence of 
skilled advice and many other services, tend to tighten the control over the retail stores 
where their products are sold
107
. In fact, it becomes much more difficult to control this 
kind of risks when a supplier has to deal with an online platform thus being thereof, 
legitimate for them to adopt a more cautious approach towards online distribution in 
order to protect the reputation of their products
108
. However, if that is now acceptable 
among the literature and jurisprudence, the truth is that only in the 90’s did the 
Commission accept this justification as an argument with the Yves Saint-Laurent 
Perfumes Decision
109
. Traditionally, the justification allowed was the technical 
improvement which the consumer could be provided with
110111
.  
Three categories of products are usually acceptably considered under these 
circumstances, namely, technologically complex and luxury branded goods, since they 
require a high-quality shopping environment, some promotion and assistance, and also 
products where the requirement of selective distribution is connected with the 
characteristics of the distribution, due to the short time they will be able to remain on 
the shelf (“shelf-life”
112
). One thing must be asserted tough, aware of the fact that the 
assessment could become rather arbitrary, courts have been holding that the nature of 
the product encompasses not only its material composition, but also the aura of prestige 
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and luxury that characterises its brand image and represents what is wanted by 




3. The undertakings’ perspectives 
 
As the author Louis Vogel managed to conclude, "The case law seems to be divided 
into two opposing trends: the wish to promote network efficiency through the 
application of competition law and the ex-ante regulation of distribution systems driven 
more by the will to ensure the greatest degree of freedom of movement of goods or the 
protection of the category of competitors instead of a more neutral protection of 
competition as a whole."
115
. 
This debate, however, is not a novelty. Actually, since the review of the old VBER 
rules we face an intense debate between the promoters of a certain degree of freedom to 
delimitate the distribution network, on one side, and the so-called pro-internet lobby, on 
the other. While the former argued the importance of controlling the possibility to 
restrict the distribution through online platforms, the latter held that all restrictions on 
online sales must be individually, and strictly, justified and they should not benefit from 
the VBER. 
 
3.1. The luxury goods owners’ perspective 
 
From an economic point of view, the application of restrictive clauses on online sales 
may give rise to both efficiencies to the consumers and competition risks
116
. The 
promoters of freedom to define the distribution network firmly defend that both courts 
and authorities should focus on the efficiencies, firstly, in order to apply a fair treatment 
to the supplier that included the restrictive clause in its contract and, secondly, and most 
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important, to provide consumers the benefits that can come from the application of 
those restrictions. 
Specifically targeting their argumentation towards the benefits of introducing certain 
bans on online sales, mainly when it is introduced within a selective distribution system 
, which is by them considered “the heart of the luxury goods industry’s business 
model”
117
, this line of thought builds their defence on an already explained argument: 
the preservation of the brand image, to which we remit. Therefore, it is highly defended 
that the pre- and post-service provided, the whole experience surrounding the 
purchase/sell process and the protection of the aura of luxury of the products that the 
client is specifically seeking should be preserved under these specific circumstances.  
 
3.2. Third-party platforms’ perspective 
 
Third-party platforms are, essentially, intermediaries between suppliers or 
distributors and end customers for the sale of a particular product, despite the fact that 
they are not distributors or resellers themselves. Thus, they enable the supplier or 
distributors to sell products to end costumers through an online shopping platform, 
constituting an alternative to the typical brick and mortar shops
118
. 
 Many are the reasons appointed by this side of the debate to defend a stricter 
approach towards the restriction of internet sales
119
, such as the increase of transparency 
and the reduction of searching costs, the facilitation of entering the market and the 
mitigation of retailers’ risks and marketing costs, all in all, developing a more dynamic 
competitive environment. Let us have a quick look through the arguments. 
First of all, there are the arguments defending a higher level of transparency and 
lowering search costs, which are based on the idea that, since there is a much larger 
variety of products, customers are presented with a lot of information providing them 
the possibility to compare quality and prices and, overall, to be better informed about 
what they ought to buy.  
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Secondly, as third-party platforms are seen as marketplaces where fierce inter-
brand competition takes place. The immediate comparison of products of the same 
brand from different distributors results in fierce price competition. An absolute ban 
would reduce this price competition considerably.  
Thirdly, there is the argument that small-  and medium-sized distributors do not 
have sufficient funds to create a platform of the same magnitude as Amazon or eBay,  
for instance, therefore their platforms tend to have a rather limited access to the market. 
In this type of cases, an absolute ban could prevent these distributors from reaching a 
wider customer group or, ultima ratio, seal off the possibility of their entry on the 
market.  
To conclude, we find it pertinent to quote the author Ezrachi: “regardless of the 
popularity of online platforms in some jurisdictions, absolute marketplace bans are 
likely to reduce competition, limit access and generate a ripple effect which could 
undermine the competitive dynamics.”
120
. Bearing in mind these words and all that was 
stated above, the so-called pro-internet lobby line of thought defends that both European 
and national courts and authorities should have a close and tight control on the 
restrictions that can be appointed to online distribution in order to guarantee the 
maintenance of a balanced and fair competition between all the undertakings operating 
and trying to operate in the market. 
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V. Court and National Authorities Approaches 
 
 
1. The ECJ’s approach: the Pierre Fabre Case 
 
1.1.Before the Pierre Fabre Case 
 
Regarding selective distribution systems, it was traditionally understood that the 
legality of the selective distribution systems was directly connected with the compliance 
with certain specific qualitative criteria. Indeed, since the Metro (1) case
121
, 
jurisprudence of the European Courts had developed the so-called “Metro Criteria”, 
which established that the nature of the product must impose a necessity to preserve its 
quality, as well as ensuring its proper use. Therefore, it was peacefully acknowledged 
that the resellers could be selected on the basis of objective criteria of a qualitative 
nature, provided that it was applied uniformly to all the potential distributors and not in 
a discriminatory manner, circumscribing strictly to the necessary extent. Later on, 
following the path outlined by the previous decisions, we find the AEG Telefunken case 
that clearly recognized that “there are legitimate requirements, such as the maintenance 
of a specialist trade capable of providing specific services as regards high-quality and 
high-technology products, which may justify a reduction of price competition in favour 
of competition relating to factors other than price. Systems of selective distribution, in 
so far as they aim at the attainment of a legitimate goal capable of improving 
competition in relation to factors other than price, therefore constitute an element of 
competition which is in conformity with Article 85 (1)”
122
. Both these decisions 
constituted a huge step as they ended up conveying some flexibility to the ECJ‘s 
positioning towards distribution agreements, which would be essential to the further 
developments of this positioning according to the market and, subsequently, to the 
customers’ necessities. However, as far as online selling is concerned, the ECJ’s 
position was not so flexible. Reflecting that stricter approach, we must mention a 
decision from 2003
123
 that clearly states that a ban on online sales should only be 
accepted under exceptional circumstances, highlighting that there should be a vast range 
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of alternatives to such a restriction. Regarding a ban on the possibility of selling 
pharmaceutical products via internet, the ECJ managed to conclude that the restriction 
lacked proportionality, arguing that EU law already provided sufficient protection. 
 
1.2.The Pierre Fabre Case and its consequences 
 
Pierre Fabre Dermo-Cosmétique, a manufacturer of cosmetics and other personal 
care products, celebrated distribution agreements for its products requiring that sales 
must be made exclusively in a physical space and in the presence of a pharmacist, 
excluding the possibility of selling their products via internet platforms. In 2008, the 
French Competition Authority decided that those contracts infringed both French and 
EU law, thus considering them a hardcore restriction under article 101(1). That decision 
was challenged in front of the Cour d’Appel de Paris
124
, which decided to address the 
ECJ a request for a preliminary rule about article 101, inquiring whether a general and 
absolute ban on internet sales constitutes a restriction by object and if it could benefit 
from any exemption. In its decision, handed down on 13th October 2011, the ECJ ruled 
that a contractual clause requiring sales to be made in a physical space constituted a 
restriction by object unless the clause is objectively justified by the nature of the 
product itself
125
. Regarding this possibility of objectively justifying this type of clauses, 
the ECJ held that a ban on internet sales may only be appropriately justified where there 




 Notwithstanding, a critical comment is now in order. In fact, the ECJ starts by 
stating that it does not rely on the mere form of restraints, but in coherence with the 
settled case law, it adopts a case-by-case approach, considering the content, objectives 
and legal and economic context of each case
127
; However, it ends up by defining that a 
ban on online sales within a selective distribution system must be qualified as a 
restriction by object, unless objectively justified, which tends to be just what it aims to 
avoid: a mere void of a clause based on the mere form of the restraint. And, in fact, the 
economic analysis was not done, since both intra- and inter-brand competition were 
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very strong in that market, allowing this kind of restriction to be implemented when 
some reasonable criteria was recalled, as Pierre Fabre managed to do, in our humble 
opinion, even though the ECJ decided differently
128129
.  
As for the Jaguar Land Rover decision, held in 2012 after the Pierre Fabre case 
already mentioned above, we find it brings a different input. With this decision, we are 
able to testify a more realistic and pragmatic approach, anchored in the conviction that 
the role of competition law is to endorse competition and not to protect particular 
operators wishing to force network heads to accept them. By qualifying special criteria 
as the precise content against which it may be verified, the ECJ grants the supplier 
freedom to set a numerus clausus without having to previously objectively justify the 
list in a uniform manner
130131
. Although this decision does not specifically mention 
online sales, the truth is that the “greater freedom gradually recognised for networks to 
the limits of competition law is however called partially into question by the recent 
developments in the case law favourable to online selling by distributors on 
marketplaces”
132
. Following the same line of thought more recently the Commission 
has also been defending a more flexible economic-based approach. We can substantiate 
this by reading its recent Preliminary e-Commerce Report, in which the Commission 
noted that the impact and the importance of marketplace bans vary significantly 
between MS and product categories, arguing that the ruling in Pierre Fabre is not on 




2. National Courts and Authorities’ approaches 
 
Also, among the national courts and authorities’ decisions, resembling what we have 
concluded above, we may find two different approaches concerning the treatment to be 
given to the ban on online sales. On the one hand, some defend that there shouldn’t be 
any left space for the existence of restrictions on online sales. On the other hand, we 
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find a more flexible and effects-based line of thought that advocates the need to analyse 
every situation and evaluate the need to objectively justify some restrictions, inclusively 
as far as online selling is concerned. 
In defence of the first position, we should start by mentioning a German authority 
decision
134
 that, by issuing a stricter decision, ruled that in this regard restrictions 
imposed on online sales of contact lenses were not justified, arguing that less restrictive 
options could have been adopted, such as requiring proof of a recent contact lens fitting. 
Defending the existence of an alternative, it shrunk the possibility of justifying a ban on 
online sales. Later, in its Adidas Judgement
135
, the German authority went further still 
and stated that suppliers should be prohibited from largely eliminating a principal 
distribution channel, with so including the internet channel. Following the same level of 
strictness, we find the Casio decision by the Schleswig Higher Regional Court
136
, which 
ruled that the supplier was strictly prohibited to ban its retailers from selling via online 
market places such as Amazon and E-bay. The German court stated that such a ban 
could limit intra-brand competition on online market-places and therefore force a 
reduction of pressure on prices. It had, also highlighted that consumers trusted 
transaction security on the established online market-places, which is a major indicative 
that this constitutes an advantage from the customers’ point of view. The German court 
also highlighted that Casio’s justifications, mainly supported by the need to ensure 
quality and a specialized assistance, could not be taken into account outside a selective 
distribution system, establishing that the ban on online sales should be completely 
prohibited outside a selective distribution system
137
. 
Supporting the latter position we also find many decisions from all around 
Europe, mainly in France and Germany but also Spain, as we will see. As the author 
Dolmans manages to conclude, among these decisions “it appears that a pragmatic 
approach was taken to restrictions on distribution of goods via the internet, with NCAs 
and courts acknowledging the need to protect investments by selective distributors 
against free riders, while balancing this with the interest of the online rival, albeit to 
varying degrees”
138
. Let us take a closer look. 
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Analysing first the French line of thought in deciding this topic, we could not 
refrain from citing the Festina case, already mentioned above, which drove the French 
authority’s attention, in which the French Court
139
decided that the criteria imposed 
should be the same, regardless of whether the sales were to be done in a physical or an 
online marketplace, provided that those criteria were applied objectively, transparently 
and in a non-discriminatory manner. In the vein of this argumentation, we must also 
mention the Bang & Olufsen case
140
, in which the French court decided that by 
absolutely preventing its authorised distributors from engaging on any online sales of 
some of their products, namely the less well-developed and cheaper ones, such as 
earphones and accessories which were particularly suitable for online sales, Bang & 
Olufsen had imposed restrictions which were not essential for maintaining an efficient 
distribution network. Even though it was decided not to exempt that specific situation, 
the truth is that by a contrario sensu, the French court appears to understand that other 




Scrutinising the German courts and authorities’ positioning in this matter, we are 
also able to find a more economic-based approach, focusing on the particularities that 
each and any case has to offer therefore establishing that an objective justification could 
raise the opportunity to exempt a restriction on online sales that would otherwise be 
considered an infringement of EU competition law. As an example, we shall mention a 
decision by the Higher Regional Court of Karlsruhe
142
 which established that the 
prohibition of distribution on online platforms did not constitute an infringement of 
competition law, as it was considered an objective aspect of a qualitative nature. Since 
advertising and product presentation could be considered an essential tool for 
maintaining a certain level of luxury environment surrounding the brand’s image, the 
supplier should then be able to decide to position its brand as a high-end product and 
therefore request certain quality standards. Similarly to what was established with this 
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decision, the Appeal Court of Berlin
143
 ruled that the prohibition of distribution on open 
marketplaces was a legitimate action in a selective distribution system. This would 
especially apply if a certain image becomes a product characteristic because of the 
supplier’s efforts to position its brand as such on the market. Following the same logical 
construction, the Higher Regional Court of Munich
144
 also defended that suppliers 
should be free to forbid their retailers from distributing their products on open 
marketplaces, thus allowing the ban on online market places to be exempted, provided 
that there is a fair and reasonable justification behind that specific restriction. 
Exploring the line of thought that Spanish courts have been following, we find 
that they tend to have a less formalistic approach, conceding the possibility to restrict 
online sales when the situation is objectively justified. An interesting decision that 
clearly reflects this position is presented by the Juzgado de lo Mercantil de Palma de 
Mallorca
145
, in which the Spanish court defended that the owners of a luxury brand 
could restrict the sale of their products on online platforms, which were considered low-
cost, in order to preserve their quality and luxury image. In the same vein, we have 
another Spanish court decision
146
 that also defended that luxury brand owners should be 
able to require from their non-authorized distributors the fulfilment of the same criteria 
imposed to the authorized distributors, enhancing the need to protect the brand as a 
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Since the current framework on online sales strictly confines the ability of 
suppliers to restrict internet sales, the Commission tries to counterbalance by 
introducing a more economic based approach, thus acknowledging the existence of 
efficiencies that may narrow the scope of application of the block exemption. However, 
this attempt is far from having been achieved, given the fact that the ECJ, some NCAs 
and National Courts remain anchored to previous formalistic approach. We believe that 
this rather formalistic approach is due to the fact that the Commission still gives a 
different treatment to online distribution in comparison to bricks and mortar 
distribution, and that is not correct, as it shows a retrograde perspective of the issue. 
Indeed, if there was a time when the internet distribution channel was not developed 
enough, justifying the need to implement its growth by applying a stricter regulation, 
nowadays, given the possibility of suppliers to impose restrictions on the physical 
distribution, but not equivalent restrictions on online distribution, that is no longer 
appropriate given the growth and increased sophistication of the internet as a completely 
mature distribution channel per se. 
And, in fact, in the Pierre Fabre case we have a glimpse of an attempt to distinguish 
the internet sales from the brick and mortar sales, acknowledging the fact that they are 
different realities which ought to be analysed from different perspectives. A tendency 
that was continued and further developed by some national cases and authorities’ 
decisions, as we saw above. As a matter of fact, although the Pierre Fabre case 
established that a ban on online sales should not be accepted, the truth is that, if we 
analyse it closely, it appears to open a very important door that ought to be explored, 
which is precisely the possibility of accepting this kind of restrictions based either on an 
objective justification regarding the properties of the products at issue or, as a last 
resort, an individual exemption.
148
 It is also true that it quickly blocks these possibilities 
by defending that the preservation of brand image is not a legitimate objective
149
, 
however, given the fact that we hereby advocate for a more flexible, economic based 
approach, here lies the base on which we must uphold our ideas. We strongly believe 
that the Pierre Fabre case blunders in the application of the concept of restriction by 
                                                 
148
 VOGEL, Louis, The Recent Application of European Competition Law, op. cit, page 458.  
149
 Pierre Fabre case, para. 46. 
45 
 
object applied to this particular issue of online sales, as it does not recall into question 
the effects-based analysis. As the author Vogel wisely concludes, “Differently from an 
agreement on price or market sharing agreement where the effects on competition are 
in principle, purely negative, the ban on online sale of products also has positive effects 
on competition. It is therefore insufficient to record the disproportionate nature of a 
clause which is a de facto ban on online sales, in order to condemn a system, because a 
competitive assessment must be made.”
150
. Once again, we must say that the problem 
lies in the different treatment given to online distribution, which compels both European 
and national courts and authorities to lean towards a more formalistic line of thought. 
In our opinion, it is the construction of the regulation itself that leads to this 
loose interpretation. In fact, by having a black list of clauses which are presumably 
harmful and a generalist clause that foresees the possibility of objectively justifying the 
application of those restrictions, plenty of space is left to the courts and authorities to 
decide whether a restrictive clause is objectively justified facing the particularities of the 
case, and this is only intensified by the stricter treatment that is given by the ECJ to 
online sales when compared with the brick and mortar sales. Thus, we believe that a 
clarification of the framework towards an (even) more economic based approach is in 
order, if possible before the VBER and its accompanying Guidelines expire. Guided by 
consumer welfare as the key principle that supports the basis of competition policy, the 
focus should lay on the efficiencies that some restrictions may bring to consumers. 
Consequently, bearing in mind that the objective justifications that the Guidelines 
include are still sparse and vague, we firmly believe competition law would face a huge 
benefit if the Commission worked towards constructing a clear and solid list of 
objective justifications that can be applied to the clauses containing hardcore 
restrictions. Notwithstanding, aware that this is very ambitious, what we hereby propose 
is a supplementary flexibility from the ECJ, NCAs and National Courts in order to 
accompany the real evolution and necessities of the market. 
We must nevertheless say that we strongly believe not everything is wrong. As 
we had the opportunity to see above, even though national courts and authorities started 
by applying more formalistic decisions, anchored to what was said in the Pierre Fabre 
case back in 2011, which, we must remind, was examined under the remit of the old 
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VBER, what we have nowadays been increasingly facing are more flexible decisions, 
concerned with the positive impact that restrictions on online sales could bring to 
consumers and to the general development of the internal market. We believe that this is 
the correct path to tread, since it is the only way to truly follow the so-called digital 
revolution that has been under the spotlight of the European concerns (as we saw above 
in chapter one). 
Inevitably focusing on what we stated in the beginning of this study, we hereby 
conclude that the European competition policy needs to adapt to the new digital single 
market. Firstly, it must be completely aware of the development of the internet and its 
consequences on distribution law. Then it must gradually adapt the current framework 
applicable to vertical restraints and more specifically to distribution agreements and, 
more importantly, adapt the approach of the ECJ towards these matters, which will most 
certainly influence the national courts and authorities’ path. And, even though 
nowadays we face a laconic scenario, reflecting the imminent uncertainty, the truth is 
that the ECJ has in hands the possibility to restore the need of stability with the 
preliminary request that was addressed by Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt am Main, the 
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